“Immigrationomics”: A Discussion of Some Key Issues by William F. Ford
The debate about immigration, especially ille-
gal immigration, often focuses on social, cul-
tural, political, and legal issues. The economic
aspects are often ignored. However, legal and
illegal immigrants play major roles in our econ-
omy, contributing to production and spending
and the labor force and even affecting the
demographic prospects of our aging nation, as
the first wave of the large baby-boom genera-
tion approaches retirement. The purpose of this
article is to give a clearer picture of the roles
immigrants play in our economy. The possible
economic impact of various proposals to
address illegal immigration is also addressed.
t the end of 2007, an estimated 37
million immigrants accounted for
almost one-eighth of America’s
total population of just over 300
million people. Roughly 12 million of those
immigrants, about one-third of the total, are liv-
ing here illegally under our current laws. A host
of hotly debated socioeconomic issues concern-
ing those illegal immigrants has emerged as a
major legislative concern of the U.S. Congress.
And all of the candidates for president in the
2008 election are weighing in on the subject of
how best to deal with the illegal immigrants
who are now living in the United States and
how to stem the rapid growth of their ranks via
an ongoing flow of illegal border crossings.
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It is hoped that the information
presented here will help
everyone interested in the
ongoing immigration debates to
have a clearer picture of the
macroeconomic roles played by
both the legal and illegal
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7Social scientists and scholars who are not
economists are working on the major cultural
issues related to the growing presence of both
the legal and illegal immigrants in our society.
Who are all these people? Where do they come
from? Why are they here? What kinds of social
costs are they creating by their presence in our
country? How much crime and social unrest is
related to their presence? Are they interested in
and capable of being assimilated into our main-
stream society, or are they creating persistent
ethnic subcultures that undermine the cohesive-
ness of our social fabric? 
This paper will not address these sociocul-
tural issues. Rather, it will focus on the follow-
ing questions concerning the major roles that
both the legal and illegal immigrants are play-
ing in our economy: What do they contribute to
the total output of our economy? What roles do
they play in our labor force overall and in spe-
cific major industries? How much of our
national income do they generate? How impor-
tant is their consumer spending as a driving
force in the economy? And finally, how does
their growing presence play into the demo-
graphic future of the U.S. economy as the
nation’s 76 million baby boomers near the age
to qualify for early retirement benefits under
our current Social Security laws? 
It is hoped that the information presented
here will help everyone interested in the ongo-
ing immigration debates to have a clearer pic-
ture of the macroeconomic roles played by both
the legal and illegal immigrants in our society.
The Role of All Immigrants 
in the U.S. Economy
As noted above, an estimated 37 million
legal and illegal immigrants accounted for
about one-eighth of the total U.S. population at
year-end 2007. About 21 million of all immi-
grants, some 57 percent of them, were then in
the U.S. labor force of roughly 154 million
workers. Their labor force participation rate
was therefore about seven percentage points
higher than the overall U.S. participation rate of
about 50 percent. Moreover, some studies esti-
mate that immigrants have accounted for as
much as half of the growth in the U.S. labor
force over the past 10–15 years.
Unfortunately, there are no credible or pre-
cise estimates of these immigrants’ exact share
of the nation’s current aggregate personal
income of about $11.7 trillion or, by inference,
their contribution to the U.S. Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of roughly $13.8 trillion in
2007. Rough estimates of those macroeconomic
parameters can be gleaned from Table 1, which
indicates the possible values of immigrants’
shares of 2007 U.S. GDP, total personal income,
and consumption spending. As noted in the
table, exactly where the immigrants’ imputed
shares of U.S. aggregate output, income, and
consumption actually fall depends on their rela-
tive earnings and productivity levels compared
to the U.S. labor force as a whole. It should be
noted that although immigrants clearly produce
and earn less per worker than nonimmigrant
workers (as indicated in the range of assump-
tions shown across the top of Table 1), the fact
that their labor force participation rate is much
higher than average partly offsets this. 
Based on the crude estimates shown in the
table, the share of GDP attributed to all immi-
grants in 2007, $1.45–$1.64 trillion, is roughly
equal to the gross state product of California,
the most populous U.S. state. The middle row of
Table 1 indicates that their share of America’s
$11.7 trillion of personal income was on the
order of $1.23–$1.39 trillion. To gauge the
impact of their personal consumption spending
in the economy, a downward adjustment of 10
percent has been made to their estimated con-
sumption to reflect the fact that immigrants, on
average, remit about 10 percent of their earn-
ings to their families abroad. That would imply
their total consumption spending was probably
on the order of $980 billion in 2007 (the mid-
point estimate in the table). Also, since about
one-third of consumer spending is done at retail
stores, their estimated retail spending of $323
billion almost equaled the total sales of U.S.
Wal-Mart stores in 2007.
On the employment front, all recent studies
agree that immigrants have a significantly
higher labor force participation rate than the









continued from page 6
Assuming immigrantsʼ level of productivity, earnings, and
consumption is this much lower than the U.S. labor force:
-15% -20% -25%
Imputed share of  (in $ trillion)
$13.8 trillion GDP $1.64  $1.55  $1.45 
$11.7 trillion U.S. personal income $1.39  $1.31  $1.23 
U.S. personal consumption $1.03  $.98 $.91 
The values shown are derived from the actual U.S. 2007 GDP of
$13.8 trillion and personal income of $11.7 trillion. The imputed
shares of GDP and personal income are derived by making the indi-
cated earnings and productivity adjustments of –15 percent to –25
percent and then multiplying by .14, representing immigrantsʼ esti-
mated 14 percent share of the U.S. labor force. Their imputed share
of personal consumption is calculated as 70 percent of their GDP
share, less 10 percent, the estimated level of their remittances to
their relatives abroad.
Table 1: Estimated Contribution of
All Immigrants to U.S. GDP, Personal
Income, and Consumption in 2007
8experience, on average, a lower unemployment
rate and are younger than native-born workers.
Regarding their occupational distribution, a
variety of studies indicate that their overall
employment profile differs significantly from
the U.S. averages in various ways. For example,
there are 10 major occupational categories in
which the foreign-born proportion of all U.S.
workers is in the range of 45–53 percent, far
above the immigrants’ overall estimated work
force share of about 14 percent. Those occupa-
tions include about 50 percent of agricultural
graders, sorters, and miscellaneous farm work-
ers; 48 percent of drywall workers in the con-
struction trades; 52 percent of plasterers and
stucco workers, and an amazing 46 percent of
U.S. medical scientists.
It should be noted that the presence of
about 21 million immigrant workers in the
economy also favorably impacts the level of
U.S. price inflation over time. This finding is
based on both labor theory reasoning and a vari-
ety of empirical studies. In theory, a heavy
influx of legal and illegal workers, especially
when concentrated in occupational categories
requiring low educational achievement, would
be expected to limit wage-driven inflation in
such job markets. A number of empirical stud-
ies also support that theoretical expectation.
More generally, influxes of foreign workers into
a variety of tight labor markets, including such
high-skill categories as scientific workers,
serves to ameliorate labor cost–driven inflation-
ary pressures in those markets. And, as noted
below, if a serious effort were ever made to
expel all illegal immigrant workers, especially
in the occupations noted above, where they hold
roughly half the jobs, the expected impact on
prices in those economic sectors would cer-
tainly be worrisome, to say the least.
The Impact of Illegal Immigrants 
on the U.S. Economy
Based on the year-end U.S. population of
just over 300 million in 2007, the estimated 12
million illegal immigrants then in the nation
represented about four percent of our total pop-
ulation. The estimated number of illegal immi-
grants in the U.S. workforce, however, is about
seven million workers, suggesting that their
labor force participation rate, seven divided by
12 million, is about 58 percent, well above the
U.S. average of 50 percent.
Table 2 applies the same logic described in
Table 1 to estimate the imputed levels of the
illegal immigrants’ possible shares of U.S.
GDP, personal income, and consumption spend-
ing. Because illegal immigrants usually have
less formal education than legal immigrants, the
assumed difference between their levels of
earnings, productivity, and consumption rela-
tive to the U.S. population is greater. However,
they are adjusted downward by 25 to 35 per-
cent, rather than 15 to 25 percent as were all
immigrants in Table 1. 
Recognizing that all of the above estimates
are crude approximations, it nevertheless
appears that illegal immigrants’ imputed shares
of GDP ($404–$466 billion), personal income
($342–$395 billion), and consumption spending
($256–$293 billion) all represent significant
contributions to the overall performance of the
U.S. economy. For example, even at the lowest
estimated share of GDP, $404 billion in 2007,
the value of illegal immigrants’ contribution
exceeds that of the gross state product of 40
U.S. states and is roughly equal to Michigan’s.
Finally, it should be noted that the esti-
mated seven million jobs the illegal immigrants
hold is roughly equal to the 5 percent share of
the entire U.S. labor force that was unemployed
at the end of 2007. The immigration reform pol-
icy implications of this observation, and their
concentrated presence in certain geographic
regions and critical occupational categories, are
discussed below.
Macroeconomic Implications 
of Proposed Policies to Address 
Illegal Immigration 
Most economists and leaders of the U.S.
Congress and executive branch of our govern-
ment agree that our immigration laws need to be
reformed. The related issue of how to treat the
estimated 12 million illegal immigrants now
here also requires thoughtful consideration and
appropriate remedial action. Unfortunately,
reaching a consensus on how best to proceed
currently appears to be politically difficult, but
perhaps not impossible, to achieve. The remain-





in the economy also
favorably impacts
the level of U.S.
price inflation over
time.
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Assuming immigrantsʼ level of productivity, earnings, and
consumption is this much lower than the U.S. labor force:
-25% -30% -35%
Imputed share of  (in $ billion)
$13.8 trillion GDP $466  $435   $404 
$11.7 trillion U.S. personal income $395   $368  $342 
U.S. personal consumption $293  $274  $256 
The same calculation protocols described in Table 1 apply to this
table except that illegal immigrants are estimated to account for 4.5
percent of the U.S. labor force.
Table 2: Estimated 2007 Contribution
of Illegal Immigrants to U.S. GDP,
Personal Income, and Consumptionbasic macroeconomic issues that must be con-
sidered in evaluating proposed approaches to
immigration reform and the question of how to
treat these estimated 12 million illegal immi-
grants—as well as their estimated three million
U.S.-born children, who are citizens.
It should be recalled at the outset that the
future growth potential of any economy is
driven by two basic forces—the growth of its
labor force and dynamic improvements in its
productivity. Both of those forces affecting U.S.
economic growth are affected by our immigra-
tion policies. With regard to labor force growth,
two basic paths are open to us as a nation. 
Our population is aging, and the entire gen-
eration of baby boomers, those born between
1946 and 1964, will begin to exit the labor force
at a growing pace over the next few years. Also,
our current domestic fertility rate is well below
the demographically determined 2.1 percent
replacement rate, suggesting that further aging
and eventual shrinkage of our labor force is on
the horizon. Also, our educational systems are
clearly not producing sufficient numbers of
skilled workers and professionals to meet the
needs of our dynamically changing and growing
economy. Shortages of semiskilled and unskilled
workers in various critical occupational cate-
gories are also clearly present on the current U.S.
economic scene. As noted above and docu-
mented in numerous studies, legal and illegal
immigrants are currently filling many important
gaps in our dynamic labor markets, as witnessed
by their disproportionate presence in various job
categories across the entire skill spectrum.
Against that demographic and macroeco-
nomic backdrop, three basic immigration policy
options will be addressed below. The first and
most dramatically interesting would be to keep
our immigration laws as they stand, firmly close
our borders to further illegal immigration, and
find and deport the estimated current U.S.
cohort of about 12 million illegal immigrants.
That policy, at one end of the spectrum of
options and advocated by Republican Colorado
congressman Tancredo, a previous 2008 presi-
dential candidate, will be examined first.
The second option to be addressed is a
polar-opposite policy, which would involve
reopening our borders widely to many more
legal immigrants. As in the past, such an open-
borders policy would also provide some form of
amnesty to the current population of illegal
immigrants. 
The third option, favored by many business
groups, would involve some form of labor mar-
ket–driven reforms of immigration policy proto-
cols, focused on filling numerous gaps in our
growing labor market with immigrants. That
approach would also involve augmenting the
projected shrinkage in our domestic labor force’s
growth rate with foreign-born workers whose
skills match our economy’s evolving needs.
Option One: Tighter Border Controls
and No Amnesty
From a macroeconomic standpoint, any
proposed attempt to find and deport 12 million
illegal immigrants, rather than providing some
form of amnesty and a legal route to residency
in the United States, poses a number of impor-
tant questions. The first is whether or not it
would be economically feasible to mount a seri-
ous effort to locate, capture, legally process,
and eventually deport the 4 percent of our entire
population defined as illegal immigrants.
Consider first the costs that would be
involved in challenging our overburdened crim-
inal justice system to mount such an effort. The
author has found no credible study of the
macroeconomic costs such a program would
entail. Suppose it costs, say, only $10,000 per
person to find, arrest, judicially process, and
deport 12 million illegal immigrants. That alone
would total $120 billion. However, that esti-
mate ignores the fact that our jails and courts
are already stressed and overcrowded in dealing
with our current incarcerated population of over
two million prisoners. Tens of billions of addi-
tional investment expenditures would clearly be
required to create the added facilities, equip-
ment, and staffing needed to mount any such
massive deportation effort. An inevitable by-
product of mounting such an effort would also,
of course, involve diverting law enforcement
and judicial resources from controlling all other
forms of illegal activity plaguing our society—
including the threat of terrorism. Also, the ille-
gal immigrants living here have produced a
huge estimated cohort of three million children
who are U.S. citizens. How would they be
treated? Would they be separated from their
parents? If so, who would care for them?
Next, consider the nationwide labor market
issues involved in the proposed removal of
about seven million illegal workers from the
U.S. economy—roughly 4.5 percent of our
entire workforce. As shown in Table 3, our year-
end 2007 unemployment rate was about 5 per-
cent, representing roughly 7.7 million
unemployed U.S. workers reported to be
“actively seeking work.” Most economists
agree that a 4 percent unemployment rate,
achieved only for a few months during the past
two decades, is probably close to “full employ-
ment.” In other words, about 6.1 million work-
ers (4 percent of the entire labor force) are
currently unemployed in our nation due to what














10labor economists call “frictional” and “struc-
tural” unemployment—being in the wrong
places or having the wrong skills to find a job
near where they live. It follows then that there
may currently be less than 1.6 million unem-
ployed U.S. workers available (7.7 million
unemployed, less six million frictionally or
structurally unemployed) to fill any gaps that
might appear in our labor markets. 
How then would advocates of finding and
deporting about seven million illegal workers
propose to replace them when there may be
only about 1.5 million available unemployed
workers on hand to do that? Some argue that
discouraged unemployed workers who are not
actively seeking work (and therefore not
counted in the labor force or among the official
count of the unemployed) would quickly
emerge to fill such gaps. But 5.5 million of
them? And would anyone seriously argue that
hundreds of thousands of such discouraged
workers are actually prepared to move physi-
cally and fill jobs as farm laborers, fruit pickers,
drywall hangers, etc.? As a practical matter, few
if any seasoned labor economists with real-
world experience would argue that seven mil-
lion illegal U.S. workers could readily be
replaced without creating major labor shortages
in a wide variety of U.S. industries.
In addition to the labor market disruptions
that would surely occur if 12 million illegal
immigrants were rounded up and deported, the
impact of such a program on aggregate con-
sumption and spending must also be addressed.
As noted in the discussion of Table 2, the illegal
immigrant population probably generates more
than $350 billion of personal income, some of
which is remitted to their families abroad. Also,
there are no credible data about how their resi-
dential needs are being met. If they have, say,
four persons per household—vis-à-vis the U.S.
average of about 2.5 persons—they are proba-
bly occupying about three million apartments,
mobile homes, and houses. Removing them
would therefore also adversely affect our
already stressed housing markets. 
Moreover, their purchases of retail goods
and services, normally about one-third of per-
sonal income, would adversely affect U.S. retail
sales significantly. Especially in a few geo-
graphic areas where illegal immigrants are most
heavily concentrated—along our southern bor-
ders—regional economic crises would almost
certainly flow from implementing Congressman
Tancredo’s “find and deport” policy.
Another set of clearly unfavorable spillover
effects of forcibly removing about seven mil-
lion illegal immigrant workers from our labor
force would be reflected in post-deportation
price inflation and probable adverse affects on
both sides of our international trade balance. If
and when all those illegal workers are deported,
U.S. employers in agriculture and other indus-
tries where they are concentrated would face
higher costs in recruiting replacement workers
from the questionable pool of “discouraged
workers” referred to by deportation advocates
or in paying premium wages to a smaller work-
force pressed to work longer hours. Many such
farms and businesses, currently marginally
profitable, would also probably fail.
On the trade front, agricultural products are
a major source of U.S. export earnings that
would be threatened by wholesale deportation of
the hundreds of thousands of illegals working in
that sector. Reduced domestic production of food
and fiber products would follow and thereby
stimulate imports of such goods. The net effect
of both forces, logically, would be to deepen the
huge U.S. trade deficit, currently funded by
inflows of foreign savings, which might not be
augmented by foreign savers to service an even
larger U.S. trade deficit. The dollar’s value
would then fall further, creating additional
inflationary pressures as U.S. import prices rose.
Consider, finally, the aforementioned
demographic issues facing the economy in its
drive to maintain a sustainable real GDP growth
rate of, say, three percent or more per year. As
shown in Table 4, the 3.03 percent annual
growth rate achieved from 1990 to 2006 was
driven by a 1.24 percent rate of growth of the
U.S. population plus a 1.82 percent rate of pro-
ductivity growth. And the growth of our labor
force has been augmented significantly by
inflows of both illegal and legal immigrants
who are filling the many gaps across the entire
skills spectrum in our labor markets that domes-
tic workers are unwilling or unable to fill. 
continued on page 12









in a wide variety of
U.S. industries.
(Number of workers, in thousands, year end 2007)
1. U.S. labor force 153,667
2. Unemployed workers (5% of above)  7,683
3. Unavailable workers if NAIRU = 4%  6,147
4. Available workers above NAIRU (item 2 - 3)  1,536
5. Estimated illegal workers  7,000
6. Imputed shortage if all illegals leave (item 5 - 4) (5,464)
U.S. labor force numbers are from the Bureau of Labor Statisticsʼ “The
Employment Situation: December 2007.” The estimate of 7 million ille-
gal workers is based on “The Role of Immigrants in the U.S. Labor
Market,” a recent Congressional Budget Office paper. It estimated 6.3
million illegal workers in 2004, rounded up to the estimated 7 million
at year-end 2007 by the author, based on various anecdotal and
press reports. NAIRU = Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unem-
ployment (the so-called “natural rate of unemployment”).
Table 3: Replacing U.S. Illegal 
Workers—The Labor Force Arithmetic
11With the demographic specter of slowing
labor force growth (shown in row 2 of Table 4),
flowing from the pending retirement of U.S.
baby-boom workers, plus the subreplacement
fertility levels of U.S. women, the issue of
opening our borders more widely to a steady
and growing number of immigrant workers will
inevitably have to be addressed via meaningful
immigration policy reforms. Tancredo’s “close
the borders” approach would therefore put the
U.S. on the slower growth path shown in row 4
of the table. This is now being experienced in
Japan and various European nations whose
native populations are aging and shrinking and
whose domestic labor forces are not growing.
That brings us to option number two.
Option Two: 
Is an Open-Borders Policy Viable?
Consider, for a moment, what might hap-
pen if the world’s six billion–plus inhabitants
could actually move freely across the planet to
any place where they could hope to enjoy a
higher standard of living and greater personal
freedom. Does anyone doubt that, in such a
world of open borders, the United States would
be a prime target destination—along with
nations such as Canada and Australia? Literally
hundreds of millions of emigrants would surely
choose to leave much of Africa and such places
as North Korea, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Russia,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Haiti, Cuba, Mexico,
etc. Clearly, the U.S. public and its elected
representatives would never endorse such an
extreme version of an open-borders immigra-
tion policy.
Rather, based on our historical behavior
patterns, any immigration reform movement
toward an open-borders option would have to
be focused on one of the two following proto-
cols—both of which are embodied in our cur-
rent laws but on a highly restricted basis.
The first option is based on family-driven
immigration admissions. If members of your
immediate (or extended) family are responsible
and legal U.S. citizens or residents willing to
sponsor you, welcome to America!
The second, an economically driven option
also currently used here but on a highly restricted
basis, favors immigrants who have a work ethic
and skills needed to fill jobs in our economy that
U.S. workers can’t or won’t take on.
Congress and the executive branch of our
government could conceivably fashion a better
and much less restrictive immigration program
embodying both of those existing immigration
management principles. Ideally, such a program
would permit much larger legal annual inflows
of immigrants who have responsible family
members or employers here to sponsor and
assist them in moving toward legal residency
and eventual citizenship. Preferences might be
given to healthy young people of childbearing
age, who could help offset the rising depend-
ency ratio the nation faces as our baby boomers
retire and native-born females fail to exhibit a
fertility level high enough to stabilize our pop-
ulation’s age profile over time. As in our past
open-borders era, all such immigrants would be
screened for serious health issues, criminal
records, or terrorist affiliations and for close
familial or friendship ties to responsible U.S.
citizens or legal residents. Under such an open-
borders concept, a sharply augmented inflow of
legal immigrants would be designed to fill key
niches in our tightest labor markets for skilled,
semiskilled, and unskilled workers. 
As a practical matter, such a two-pronged
quasi-open borders approach to immigration
reform also appears to have little to no chance
of being implemented in our current political
environment. The recent failure of a major
bipartisan effort to move toward such a policy
suggests that a more narrowly focused option
needs to be considered—one that would be less
restrictive than current policies in meeting the
economy’s labor demands and that addresses
the illegal immigrants’future roles in our econ-
omy in a more politically realistic manner.
Key Elements of an Economically Viable
Plan for Immigration Reform
Based on the preceding analysis, it is clear
that the harshest proposal for immigration
reform—to “locate, process, and deport illegal
immigrants”—is fraught with major macroeco-
nomic dangers. First, it would clearly give rise
to serious and inflationary labor shortages in a
number of key U.S. industries. It would also
generate recessionary pressures by eliminating
12










Table 4: Projected Growth of Real 
U.S. GDP without Immigration
continued from page 11
(Annual percent changes) 1990 2007 2018
–2006 –2017 –2028
(actual) (est.) (est.)
Population Growth  1.24 0.91 0.83
+ Labor force participation rate -0.03 -0.25 -0.40
+ Productivity growth rate 1.82 1.82 1.82
= Real GDP growth rate 3.03 2.48 2.25
Source: Kevin Kliesen, “As Boomers Slow Down, So Might the
Economy,” The Regional Economist, St. Louis Federal Reserve
Bank, pp. 12–13, July 2007. Estimates of population and labor
force growth are from the U.S. Census Bureau and 2007 Social
Security Trustees Report.11
or reducing the significant contributions of the
12 million illegal immigrants to U.S. GDP, per-
sonal income, consumption spending, housing
demand, etc. 
Its impact on our burgeoning trade deficit
would also almost certainly be significantly
negative. That would occur, first, by reducing
the output and raising the cost structures of our
key export industries, such as agriculture,
which rely heavily on immigrant labor. In addi-
tion, U.S. demand for imports of products now
domestically produced with the help of immi-
grant labor would rise, further aggravating our
growing trade deficit. Downward pressure on
the value of the U.S. dollar would also be
expected in such a scenario, further exacerbat-
ing import-driven inflationary pressures on the
economy. Finally, the “find and deport” policy
option would overwhelm our judicial and
prison systems and create a series of regional
economic crises in the areas most heavily pop-
ulated by illegal immigrants.
Against that backdrop, it appears clear that
the so-called “no amnesty” approach to dealing
with 4 percent of the entire U.S. population,
plus their estimated three million children who
are U.S. citizens, is simply not a viable eco-
nomic option. Rather, the current seven million
illegal workers active in our labor force should
be offered a viable route to legal residence here
along with their immediate families, including,
especially, their large cohort of children born in
the United States. Our past experience with
huge influxes of mainly non-English speaking
Italians, Germans, Poles, other European immi-
grants, and various cohorts of Asian immigrants
has clearly demonstrated that they can be
absorbed successfully into our dynamic econ-
omy over time and help make it larger, stronger,
and more productive. The current hodgepodge
of U.S. immigration barriers, quotas, and other
impediments to the legal immigration of work-
ers American firms need and want to hire
clearly needs to be reworked and greatly sim-
plified to allow industries facing labor short-
ages to employ more qualified immigrant
workers—and to do it legally.
Moreover, looking ahead, as the fast-
approaching wave of 76 million U.S. baby-
boom retirees mounts, it threatens further
deterioration of the already troublesome and
shrinking ratio of U.S. workers per retiree. In
order to sustain our real GDP growth at a rea-
sonable 3 percent rate, our labor force needs to
grow by at least 1 percent annually, currently
about 1.5 million workers per year. Absent an
unexpected and highly unlikely upsurge in
fertility of U.S. childbearing women, allowing
an influx of immigrants of childbearing age
may be the only practical alternative to accept-
ing a secular decline in our economy’s future
growth potential.
The real GDP of the world’s two most pop-
ulous nations, China and India, is currently
growing about three times as fast as ours. The
United States can ill afford to allow an econom-
ically irrational anti-immigrant political attitude
to undermine the labor and demographic needs
of our economy.
Conclusion
The current popular discourse concerning
illegal immigration issues is heavily burdened
by an excess of media and politically driven
heat and a serious shortage of economic light.
Viewed through the above prism of macroeco-
nomic analysis, some of the proposed solutions
to our illegal immigration issues are clearly
naïve, especially the so-called “find and deport”
Tancredo option. Any serious attempt to imple-
ment such a policy would, in the author’s judg-
ment, generate major negative macroeconomic
repercussions. There would almost certainly be
significant negative effects on our GDP, labor
force growth and participation rate, national
income, and consumer spending. A number of
major U.S. industries would also face serious
labor shortages. Output of their products and
services would decline, with adverse effects on
our balance of payments. And the geographic
regions where illegal immigrants are most
heavily concentrated would suffer serious eco-
nomic consequences similar to those experi-
enced in hurricane-stricken areas.
At the other end of the range of possible
macroeconomic solutions to the immigration
policy issue, a return to the earlier U.S. era,
characterized by a quasi-open borders policy, is
also deemed unworkable in today’s world. Too
many troubled third-world economies would
almost certainly generate a veritable flood of
immigrants that even our dynamic economy
could not absorb. It appears, therefore, that a
new immigration policy that takes account of
the macroeconomic realities discussed above
would logically focus on meeting our econ-
omy’s market-driven needs to fill a number of
significant ongoing gaps in our labor force’s
current and projected structure. 
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